| Book Name: | Algorithmic Game Theory |
| Category: | Algorithms |
| Free Download: | Available |
Algorithmic Game Theory
In recent years, game theory has had a significant impact on computer science, especially on issues related to the Internet and e-commerce. More than 40 of the best researchers in the field have written chapters from basic to modern. Core chapters on algorithmic methods for equalization, mechanism design, and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets, cryptography, and security. secret. Students, researchers and practitioners need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their wide practical application.
Book Description
Algorithmic game theory topics cover many of the hottest areas of useful new game theory research, introducing profound new issues, techniques, and perspectives requiring the interest of economists. as well as computer scientists. The all-star list of contributing authors makes this book the best place for beginners to research.
In recent years, game theory has had a significant impact on computer science, especially on issues related to the Internet and e-commerce. More than 40 of the best researchers in the field have written chapters from basic to modern.
Core chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibration, mechanism design, and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets, cryptography and security.
Students, researchers and practitioners need to know more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their wide practical application.
In recent years, game theory has had a significant impact on computer science, especially on issues related to the Internet and e-commerce. More than 40 of the best researchers in the field have written chapters from basic to modern.
Core chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibration, mechanism design, and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets, cryptography and security.
Students, researchers and practitioners need to know more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their wide practical application.
About Author
Tim Roughgarden is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science at Stanford University. Vijay Vazirani received a bachelor’s degree in computer science from MIT in 1979 and a doctorate from the University of California, Berkeley in 1983. The main subject of his research career was the design of efficient algorithms. In addition, he has also studied complexity theory, cryptography, encryption theory, and game theory. In 2001, he published what is considered by many to be the last book on approximation algorithms; This book has been translated into Japanese, Polish and French. He is a member of ACM.
Table of contents :
1. COMPUTING GAMES
1. Basic solution concepts and computational issues, p.3 / Éva Tardos, Vijay V. Vazirani
2. The complexity of finding nash equilibria, p.29 / Christos H. Papadimitriou
3. Equilibrium computation for two-player games in strategic and extensive form, p.53 / Bernhard von Stengel
4. Learning, regret minimization, equilibria, p.79 / Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour
5. Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria, p.99 / Vijay V. Vazirani
6. Computation of market equilibria by convex programming, p.135 / Bruno Codenotti, Kasturi Varadarajan
7. Graphical games, p.159 / Michael Kearns
8. Cryptography and game theory, p.181 / Yevgeniy Dodis, Tal Rabin
II. ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN
9. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists), p.209 / Noam Nisan
10. Mechanism design without money, p.243 / James Schummer, Rakesh V. Vohra
11. Combinatorial auctions, p.267 / Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan
12. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms, p.301 / Ron Lavi
13. Profit maximization in mechanism design, p.331 / Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin
14. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design, p.363 / Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira, Scott Shenker
15. Cost sharing, p.385 / Kamal Jain, Mohammad Mahdian
16. Online mechanisms, p.411 / David C. Parkes
Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria / Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos
Routing games / Tim Roughgarden
III. QUANTIFYING THE INEFFIDENEY OF EQUILIBRIA
17. Introduction to the Inefficiency of Equilibria, p.443 / Tim Roughgarden and Éva Tardos
18. Routing Games, p.461 / Tim Roughgarden
19. Network formation games and the potential function method, p.487 / Eva Tardos and Tom Wexler
20. Selfish load balancing, p.517 / Berthold Vöcking
21. The price of anarchy and the design of the scalable resource allocation mechanisms, p.543 / Ramesh Johari
IV. ADDITIONAL TOPICS
22. Incentives and pricing in communications networks, p.571 / Asuman Ozdaglar, R. Srikant
23. Incentives in peer-to-peer systems, p.593 / Moshe Babaioff, John Chuang, Michal Feldman
24. Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues, p.613 / Jon Kleinberg
25. Incentives and information security, p.633 / Ross Anderson … [et al.] 26. Computational aspects of prediction markets, p.651 / David M. Pennock, Rahul Sami
27. Manipulation-resistant reputation systems, p.677 / Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick, Rahul Sami
28. Sponsored search auctions, p.699 / Sébastien Lahaie … [et al.] 29. Computational evolutionary game theory, p.717 / Siddharth Suri
Index, p.737.
1. Basic solution concepts and computational issues, p.3 / Éva Tardos, Vijay V. Vazirani
2. The complexity of finding nash equilibria, p.29 / Christos H. Papadimitriou
3. Equilibrium computation for two-player games in strategic and extensive form, p.53 / Bernhard von Stengel
4. Learning, regret minimization, equilibria, p.79 / Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour
5. Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria, p.99 / Vijay V. Vazirani
6. Computation of market equilibria by convex programming, p.135 / Bruno Codenotti, Kasturi Varadarajan
7. Graphical games, p.159 / Michael Kearns
8. Cryptography and game theory, p.181 / Yevgeniy Dodis, Tal Rabin
II. ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN
9. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists), p.209 / Noam Nisan
10. Mechanism design without money, p.243 / James Schummer, Rakesh V. Vohra
11. Combinatorial auctions, p.267 / Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan
12. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms, p.301 / Ron Lavi
13. Profit maximization in mechanism design, p.331 / Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin
14. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design, p.363 / Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira, Scott Shenker
15. Cost sharing, p.385 / Kamal Jain, Mohammad Mahdian
16. Online mechanisms, p.411 / David C. Parkes
Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria / Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos
Routing games / Tim Roughgarden
III. QUANTIFYING THE INEFFIDENEY OF EQUILIBRIA
17. Introduction to the Inefficiency of Equilibria, p.443 / Tim Roughgarden and Éva Tardos
18. Routing Games, p.461 / Tim Roughgarden
19. Network formation games and the potential function method, p.487 / Eva Tardos and Tom Wexler
20. Selfish load balancing, p.517 / Berthold Vöcking
21. The price of anarchy and the design of the scalable resource allocation mechanisms, p.543 / Ramesh Johari
IV. ADDITIONAL TOPICS
22. Incentives and pricing in communications networks, p.571 / Asuman Ozdaglar, R. Srikant
23. Incentives in peer-to-peer systems, p.593 / Moshe Babaioff, John Chuang, Michal Feldman
24. Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues, p.613 / Jon Kleinberg
25. Incentives and information security, p.633 / Ross Anderson … [et al.] 26. Computational aspects of prediction markets, p.651 / David M. Pennock, Rahul Sami
27. Manipulation-resistant reputation systems, p.677 / Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick, Rahul Sami
28. Sponsored search auctions, p.699 / Sébastien Lahaie … [et al.] 29. Computational evolutionary game theory, p.717 / Siddharth Suri
Index, p.737.
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Author(s): Nisan, Noam;Roughgarden, Tim;Tardos, Ev́a;Vazirani, Vijay V
Publisher: Cambridge University Press, Year: 2008
ISBN: 9780521872829
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